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Deliver Us from Our Protectors:
Accountability for Violations
Committed by Humanitarian Aid Staff
Against Refugee Women
and Children
By JAN RACHEL REYES*
Introduction
REFUGEES—OFTEN FORCED from their homes with nothing but
the clothes on their back, then confined in camps and dependent on
humanitarian aid—are among the most vulnerable groups in the
world. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), refugee populations increased from
9.9 to 11.4 million during the year 2007.1 Women and children com-
prise the majority of this number and, because of their gender and
age, are undoubtedly the most susceptible to exploitation by those in
positions of money and power encountered during their flight.2
In 2002, this exploitation was confirmed in a study commissioned
by UNHCR and Save the Children-UK (“SC-UK”)3 that found sexual
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1. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), Divi-
sion of Operational Services: Field Information and Coordination Support Selection, 2007
Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons, 2
(June 2007) (Figures do not include Palestinian refugees or internally displaced persons).
2. See iVillage.co.uk, The World of Refugee Women, http://www.ivillage.co.uk/news
pol/camp/refuge/articles/0,,186771_186926,00.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2009) (An esti-
mated seventy-five to eighty percent of refugees are women and children. Statistics were
taken from REFUGEES magazine, published by UNHCR).
3. UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, Note for Implementing and Operational Partners
on Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra
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exploitation of women and children was widespread throughout refu-
gee camps in West Africa. To the shock of the international commu-
nity, the report revealed that many of these violators were staff
members of notable and large humanitarian agencies—the very peo-
ple entrusted with the safety and protection of refugee rights. In Si-
erra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia alone, almost seventy aid workers
from forty agencies were allegedly involved.4
In response to the UNHCR and SC-UK report, the United Na-
tions (“UN”) appointed the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(“IASC”) Task Force to investigate the findings of the report, and
then develop a plan to prevent and respond to the sexual abuse and
sexual exploitation that occurs during times of humanitarian crises.5
At the direction of the IASC Task Force, the Office of Internal Over-
sight Services (“OIOS”) assembled a team of professional investiga-
tors, lawyers, refugee protection and human rights specialists,
translators, and a pediatric trauma specialist who conducted a year-
long investigation.6 The UN Secretary General’s Report (“OIOS Re-
port”) on the investigation into violations by aid workers in West Af-
rica agreed with the general findings by UNHCR and SC-UK, but it
discredited many of the alleged cases discovered by UNHCR and SC-
UK.7 As a result of its findings, the UN recommended universal codifi-
cation of appropriate behavior and punishment for humanitarian aid
workers. Unfortunately, these measures either have proven ineffective
or have not been implemented.
Fresh allegations of sexual misconduct, implicating aid workers,
have once again arisen, illustrating the continued urgent need to en-
force agreements and guidelines to protect refugees and hold perpe-
trators accountable. In 2006, SC-UK verified that conditions in
Liberian refugee camps had not changed and the exploitation and
Leone, Feb. 27, 2002, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.
pdf?id=3c7cf89a4&tbl=PARTNERS.
4. Ruth Gidley, UN Says Refugee Exploitation Is Serious, but Not Widespread, ALERTNET,
Oct. 25, 2002, http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/541377.htm [hereinafter
Widespread].
5. IASC Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse in
Humanitarian Crises, IASC Task Force Mission Report: Liberia and Sierra Leone, 21–31 (Oct.
2002) [hereinafter IASC Task Force].
6. Id. at 3.
7. See The Secretary-General, Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid
Workers in West Africa, 3, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/465 (Oct. 11, 2002)
[hereinafter Investigation].
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abuse of children continued.8 In 2008, SC-UK published a study de-
tailing widespread sexual exploitation of children in southern Sudan,
Cote d’Ivoire, and Haiti, and the media reported that Indian UN
Peacekeepers deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo “used
children to hire Congolese girls for sex.”9
Enforcing the recommendations set forth by UN agencies has
proven problematic because there is no governing body yet identified
to hold violators accountable. In order to both prevent exploitation
and address violations, the international community requires
stronger, stricter processes to change current practices, discipline per-
petrators, and provide relief to victims. This Comment demonstrates
the inadequacy of the current handling of sexual violence against ref-
ugee women and children by peacekeepers and aid workers, and pro-
poses that measures of accountability and increased participation of
women at all decision-making levels would aid in the prevention and
relief of the sexually exploited.
For the purpose of this Comment, the term sexual exploitation
refers specifically to “situations in which an international NGO [non-
governmental organization], humanitarian or aid worker, in a posi-
tion of power, uses that power to request sexual favors or benefits by
trading food or services that refugees are entitled to receive free of
charge via the distribution system of international aid.”10 This Com-
ment will also address issues of sexual conduct exchanged for money.
I. Sexual Exploitation by Humanitarian Aid Workers
Focusing on the West African countries of Liberia, Guinea, and
Sierra Leone, the report commissioned by UNHCR and SC-UK in
2002 exposed the proliferation of transactional sex between women
and children in refugee camps with humanitarian aid staff. The subse-
quent study performed in 2006 by SC-UK verified conditions had not
changed in Liberian refugee camps.
8. Save the Children-UK, From Camp to Community: Liberia Study on Exploitation of Chil-
dren, May 8, 2006, available at www.savethechildren.org/publications/liberia-exploitation-
v4.pdf [hereinafter Liberia].
9. Save the Children, No One to Turn To: The Under-reporting of Child Sexual Exploitation
and Abuse by Aid Workers and Peacekeepers, May 27, 2008, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/483c2a822.html [hereinafter No One]; Rahul Singh, 10 Indian Peacekeepers
in Congo Sex Scandal, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, http://www.hindustantimes.com/
News/india/Indian-peacekeepers-in-Congo-sex-scandal/Article1-344224.aspx.
10. Investigation, supra note 7, at 3. R
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A. The Abused
Both reports found that the majority of children involved were
girls twelve years of age and older; however, girls as young as eight
were also involved.11 The girls at highest risk of exploitation and
abuse tended to be children under the age of fourteen, children living
by themselves or heading households of younger siblings, children liv-
ing with very old parents or with single mothers, children living in
families that were very poor, and children living with step-parents, fos-
ter parents, or extended family members.12
Both studies identified several factors that can lead women and
children to exchange sex for goods and services. The primary factor is
severe economic deprivation in which insufficient rations and supplies
force women and children to trade sex.13 Frequently, incomplete ra-
tions and delayed delivery make food distribution unreliable.14 When
food is provided, rations are assumed to last for thirty days, but in
reality last only ten days.15 The time gap between when rations run
out and when another distribution occurs is termed “zero week,” and
is often the time when women and girls turn to trading sex as a “cop-
ing mechanism to make ends meet.”16 When distributors have a sur-
plus of supplies remaining, the male camp leaders heading supply
distribution have unregulated discretionary power to control the ulti-
mate disbursement of excess rations.17
The patriarchal hierarchy that plagues camp structures contrib-
utes to the desperation of women and children. Author Royce Bern-
stein Murray states, “Decisions about food assistance . . . and how to
distribute the aid are generally made by international organizations
and host countries in consultation with the male leaders of the camps,
without including the effective participation of refugee women.”18 In
addition, men predominantly control the distribution process, with
women remaining mere beneficiaries.19 Women remain misinformed
11. See Liberia, supra note 8, at 5; UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, supra note 3, at R
3.
12. Liberia, supra note 8, at 11.
13. See UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, supra note 3, at 8. R
14. Id.
15. Id. at 9.
16. See IASC Task Force, supra note 5, at 4. R
17. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 13. R
18. Royce Bernstein Murray, Sex for Food in a Refugee Economy: Human Rights Implica-
tions and Accountability, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 985, 991–92 (2000).
19. Id. at 1021.
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about how their entitlements and allocations are decided—ultimately
leaving them powerless and distrustful of the process.20
In addition, women in the affected countries lack income-gener-
ating opportunities capable of sustaining long-term stability.21 These
countries of refuge often have “feeble economies” unable to provide
adequate income.22 Because very few women hold key positions in the
camp, there are few opportunities for them to support themselves and
their children.23 NGOs and UNHCR occasionally hire refugees, but
most of these opportunities involve day labor where mostly male refu-
gees are hired.24 Training programs for refugee women generally
prove futile as there are virtually no jobs available to utilize learned
skills nor are there sufficient funds to sustain small business
attempts.25
The nature of conflict frequently destroys social norms by tearing
apart traditional family structures and forcing women and children to
become heads of their households.26 This increases a woman’s or
child’s willingness or need to engage in transactional sex.27 When a
girl returns home with money or supplies, her family does not ask how
she earned it. Refugees told the UNHCR and SC-UK assessment team
that the only way—the “easiest” way—to access money in the refugee
community is to both sell their food rations and let their daughters
enter into sexually exploitative relationships.28 Although the commu-
nity does not approve of such practices, they have come to accept it
because of their weak position in camp life.29
B. The Abusers
Abusers come from a broad range of humanitarian occupations,
including UN Peacekeepers, government officials, law enforcement,
teachers, and camp leaders,30 and are generally adult men between
the ages of thirty and sixty.31 Because humanitarian aid workers in
20. See id. at 1021–22.
21. See IASC Task Force, supra note 5, at 4. R
22. Id. at 7.
23. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 14. R
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Brent W. Hanson et al., Refocusing and Prioritizing HIV Programmes in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Settings: Funding Recommendations, 22 AIDS S95, S100 (2008).
27. Id.
28. See UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, supra note 3, at 8. R
29. See Liberia, supra note 8, at 13. R
30. Id. at 11.
31. Id.
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Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone have easy access to supplies and
hold positions of power, they are often the perpetrators. National and
international NGO and UN employees are perceived to be men of
status because they are paid relatively well compared to other employ-
ees and often have access to transportation. Frequently they distribute
food or material goods, which they use to entice girls. Other agency
workers ask girls for sex in exchange for employment and then con-
tinue to demand sexual favors even after the girls are employed.32
Findings also suggest it is common for international NGOs to enlist
the help of local NGOs to solicit girls for sex.33
Citing legal concerns, fears about the safety of child victims still
living in the refugee camps, and limitations of anecdotal information,
UNHCR and SC-UK initially refused to furnish a complete list of
NGOs implicated in the activities in its 2002 report.34 Finally, after a
number of closed-door meetings, the NGOs were furnished with the
confidential information.35 Although the eighty-four-page report is
still unavailable to the public, notable NGOs listed among the perpe-
trators include: Doctors Without Borders, the American Refugee
Committee, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies/Guinea Red Cross, Lutheran World Service/World
Federation, Norwegian Refugee Council, Council of Churches–Sierra
Leone, Germany’s BMZ, Medical Relief International, and Family Em-
powerment Program.36 Both UNHCR and SC-UK were also implicated
in the report, as was UN-operated World Food Programme.37
C. The Proliferation of Abuse
Overwhelmingly dependent on goods and services, refugees find
themselves trapped because they are unable to challenge aid agencies
without suffering debilitating repercussions.38 Not only are the mech-
anisms and procedures in place for reporting abuses and safeguarding
refugee health and confidentiality inadequate,39 but also refugees are
ignorant of their rights. Many refugees do not know where to report
32. See UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, supra note 3, at 5. R
33. See Liberia, supra note 8, at 12. R
34. U.N. Finally Forced to Probe Its Pedophilia Scandal, United Press International, NEWS
MAX.COM WIRES, May 7, 2002, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/5/6/
151901.shtml.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, supra note 3, at 5. R
39. Id.
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN108.txt unknown Seq: 7  2-OCT-09 12:26
Summer 2009] HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS 217
cases of underage sex when members of camp management and lead-
ers are themselves involved.40 Moreover, with NGO workers held in
such high regard and treated as important people by the community,
refugees fear retaliation or withdrawal of the NGO’s provisions if they
make problems known.41 The UNHCR and SC-UK report states:
Refugees complained that they have tried to send written com-
plaints through other staff but that the information has been held
back. Children complained that they are harassed or labeled or
denied services when they tried to complain. Refugees spoke of
trying to see senior staff but being stopped by security guards
outside their offices.42
If a refugee reports or files a complaint, the refugee could be singled
out and prevented from receiving further aid, or the NGO could sim-
ply move its operations.
It appears that the culture surrounding humanitarian aid organi-
zations propagates impunity.43 A “conspiracy of silence” exists among
the agency workers, where staff will “not pass on information about a
colleague involved in sexual exploitation for risk of being stigmatized
and ostracized.”44 In addition, there is an “apparent pressure to con-
form within the humanitarian community, [leading] staff to also in-
dulge in exploitive behavior.”45 OIOS found that the further a camp is
from the UNHCR branch office, the less attention the camp’s re-
sidents receive from international staff.46
Conditions in the camps are further exacerbated because staff
members work under extremely difficult and minimally rewarding cir-
cumstances. Though there are members who are highly dedicated,
others are fatigued by their environment and have varying commit-
ments and interests towards refugees.47 In addition, refugees refuse to
report cases, viewing transactional sex as monetarily beneficial. Some
refugees involved believed the exchange of sex for goods was valuable
and advantageous.48
Furthermore, in many cases, the legal framework within a country
places huge obstacles in the way for those willing to report claims.
Lack of legal protection and law enforcement dissuades women and
40. See Liberia, supra note 8, at 14. R
41. Id.
42. See UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, supra note 3, at 6. R
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id.
46. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 11. R
47. Id.
48. See Liberia, supra note 8, at 14. R
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children from pursuing complaints.49 Other reasons refugees fail to
seek redress include:
• lack of laws against sexual and gender-based violence;
• lack of trust in law enforcement authorities;
• application of customary and traditional laws and practices that
enforce gender discrimination;
• lack of trust in law enforcement authorities;
• discriminatory practice in justice administration and law
enforcement;
• lack of willingness to effectively prosecute all cases reported to
authorities;
• low number of prosecutions obtained in proportion to the num-
ber of cases reported;
• police and courts inaccessible because of remote location of
camps;
• absence of female law enforcement officers;
• lack of administrative resources and equipment by local courts
and security officials; and
• laws or practices in the administration of justice that support
gender.50
II. Immediate International Attempts to Redress
When the British Broadcasting Company revealed the findings
the UNHCR and SC-UK’s 2002 report detailing aid worker violations,
an international uproar ensued. The UN and international and local
NGOs quickly attempted to implement new procedures to ensure
proper measures were taken against violators, including awareness-
raising in both the humanitarian and beneficiary community, develop-
ment of investigative protocols and channels for recourse, and an in-
crease in monitoring staff.51 However, the UN-appointed IASC Task
Force found that few NGOs successfully installed internal mechanisms
to manage their own staff.52 IASC also recognized that without a base-
line survey of adequate monitoring and evaluation of initiatives, it was
difficult to determine what measures might actually work.53 The IASC
stated, “[i]t has been impossible to determine if the incidence of sex-
ual exploitation and abuse has increased or decreased.”54
49. UNHCR, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Refugees, Returnees and Internally
Displaced Persons: Guidelines for Prevention and Response, 22 (May 2003), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3edcd0661.html [hereinafter Guidelines].
50. Id. at 22.
51. See IASC Task Force, supra note 5, at 9. R
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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The UN, through OIOS, initiated its own investigation of
UNHCR’s and SC-UK’s findings. As a result of this investigation, it
acknowledged the existence of widespread sexual violence against ref-
ugee women and children in West Africa by humanitarian agency
staff, yet still seemed to discredit the UNHCR’s and SC-UK’s initial
findings. Seemingly embarrassed by the actions of some UNHCR staff
and the international response to the UNHCR/SC-UK findings, the
OIOS report stated, “[b]y reporting, with little or no evidence, that
sexual exploitation is widespread, the consultants unfairly tarnished
the reputation and credibility of the large majority of aid workers, na-
tional and international staff of United Nations agencies and NGOs
and United Nations peacekeepers in West Africa.”55 The UN claims
there is no firm evidence that the problem extends beyond West Af-
rica, or that aid workers are regularly involved.56
However, other agencies, including SC-UK, disagree with the
UN’s position. SC-UK claims “few UN agencies and NGOs collect de-
tailed information on the abuse of children by their own personnel,
and even fewer make this information publicly available.”57 The
OIOS’s investigation was inherently problematic not only because it
did not occur until one year later, but also because of the increasing
difficulty in identifying the status of individuals in refugee camps still
surrounded by armed conflict, such as in Liberia.58 Refugees are in-
herently mobile—being repatriated to their home countries, moving
to the urban centers, or simply disappearing—and camps are so
densely populated and disorganized that people are difficult to locate.
In addition, because UNHCR and SC-UK consultants purposely de-
scribed those they interviewed with vagueness to maintain confidenti-
ality, the OIOS team was unable to find all those interviewed. Thus,
specific cases cited by UNHCR and SC-UK went unverified and, al-
though possibly true, OIOS discredited them.
Although OIOS noted these inherent difficulties in corroborat-
ing claims made by a refugee community, it maintained that many of
the cases reported in the UNHRC and SC-UK report did not justify
the overwhelming reaction of the international community. OIOS
concluded that because it could not confirm any of the specific stories
detailed in the UNHRC and SC-UK report, the report was misleading.
OIOS did confirm ten out of the forty-three cases identified in the
55. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 15. R
56. See Widespread, supra note 4. R
57. No One, supra note 9, at 10. R
58. See IASC Task Force, supra note 5, at 3. R
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2002 Report, including those involving a forty-four-year-old UN volun-
teer’s sexual relationship with a seventeen-year-old refugee, and the
rape of a fourteen year-old refugee by a Sierra Leonean refugee and a
Guinean NGO staff member.59 Furthermore, the IASC stated, “[i]n
setting up the Task Force, IASC recognized that the problem of sexual
exploitation and abuse in humanitarian crises is not confined to West
Africa but is a global problem.”60
The OIOS investigation should not diminish the reality that viola-
tions are occurring at the hands of humanitarian aid workers. Even
given the limited scope of victims and the failure of corroboration, the
surfacing of similar stories in different countries reported by various
organizations indicates a major problem facing the international
community.
III. The Duty to Redress
Although the UN initially contested widespread abuse, studies
conducted since 2002 continue to pinpoint humanitarian aid workers
as major perpetrators of sexual exploitation (beyond the camps) in
Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.61 With such numerous locations
and humanitarian agencies involved, it is difficult to identify which
method to employ in solving these problems or under which interna-
tional law solutions could be implemented. Rules governing interna-
tional conduct and accountability stem from two separate bodies of
regulations—international humanitarian law and international
human rights law.
A. International Humanitarian Law
As defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(“ICRC”), international humanitarian law is a set of international
rules established by treaty or custom specifically intended to solve hu-
manitarian problems that directly arise from international or non-in-
ternational armed conflicts.62 It protects persons that are, or can
potentially be, affected by an armed conflict and narrows the legal
methods and means of warfare used by the parties to a conflict.63 Im-
59. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 9. R
60. Id. at 20.
61. See Liberia, supra note 8; No One, supra note 9, at 10; Singh, supra note 9. R
62. International Committee of the Red Cross, What is International Humanitarian
Law? (July 13, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/hu-
manitarian-law-factsheet?opendocument [hereinafter ICRC: Humanitarian Law].
63. Id. at 1–2.
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portant provisions of humanitarian law specifically providing protec-
tion for women derive from the four Geneva Conventions. Liberia,
Guinea, and Sierra Leone are among the countries that have ratified
these Conventions.
Much like conventions, treaties, case law, and national law, inter-
national humanitarian law also derives from customary law, which is
defined as the “general practice accepted as law.”64 Such practice can
be found in several places including official accounts of military oper-
ations, military manuals, national legislation, case law, and other offi-
cial documents.65 In order to provide a complete source of recognized
customary international humanitarian laws, the ICRC undertook the
enormous task of compiling existing laws and publishing the results.
The advantage of customary law is that all parties involved in armed
conflict are bound by these regulations. Customary law is not re-
stricted to only those who have ratified a treaty, and it applies to all
forms of conflict, whether international or non-international.66
One hundred sixty-one rules make up the ICRC’s list of custom-
ary international humanitarian law.67 Rules 134–135 order specific
protection, health, and assistance for women and children affected by
armed conflict.68 In both international and non-international armed
conflicts, customary law taken from the Geneva Conventions either
explicitly or implicitly calls for the respect of specific needs of wo-
men.69 Similar terms address the special protection of children.70
The general opinion is that violations of international humanita-
rian law . . . stem from an unwillingness to respect the rules, from
insufficient means to enforce them, from uncertainty as to their
application in some circumstances and from a lack of awareness of
them on the part of political leaders, commanders, combatants
and the general public.71
64. International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian
Law: Questions and Answers (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/site
eng0.nsf/iwpList133/E02D32D1A4976030C1256FEB005007A1.
65. Id.
66. Id. at vii–viii.
67. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW: VOLUME 1: RULES (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005).
68. Id. at 475–82.
69. Id. at 475–76.
70. Id. at 479–81.
71. Jeanne-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, International
Committee of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 857 (Mar. 2005).
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State accountability is ruled by international humanitarian law.72 For
the most part, only states involved in armed conflict, not individuals,
are subject to international humanitarian law. These states remain
hesitant in providing relief unless the UN officially recognizes refugee
status. In addition, governments wish to reserve funds for their own
people and are less likely to provide adequate safeguards for refugees
because of financial constraint. And, because most camps are left in
the control of appointed camp administrators or humanitarian agen-
cies, government officials may have limited participation in the daily
administration and workings of refugee camps.
Furthermore, international humanitarian law seemingly applies
only to those involved in the conflict. A neutral country cannot techni-
cally be held to international humanitarian law because they are not
parties to the conflict and may not be subject to the rules of war. Re-
ceiving countries not involved in the conflict have the same legitimate
interests as other countries with refugees within their borders. How-
ever, with no threat of armed conflict, receiving countries may wish to
be exempt from international humanitarian law in order to behave in
less scrutinized ways. At some basic level, every government owes a
duty to people within their borders to honor their fundamental
human rights as provided by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.73 The problem then involves more than just preventive mea-
sures, but rather includes the judicial enforcement of law against the
perpetrators.
Even if it were possible to address the problems with state ac-
countability, the problem of identifying international standards gov-
erning individual responsibility remains. It is unclear whether those
handling the basic day-to-day business within the camps, such as hu-
manitarian agencies, refugee camp administrators, and others, are
subject to international humanitarian law. As non-governmental bod-
ies, they may not be required to abide by codified conduct under in-
ternational humanitarian law. However, as participants in the
aftermath of armed conflict, NGOs and camp administrators should
have some accountability.
With the advent of the various international criminal tribunals—
most importantly the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)—interna-
tional humanitarian law is becoming more applicable to individuals.
Although the ICC is a permanent judicial body whose jurisdiction is
72. See ICRC: Humanitarian Law, supra note 62, at 1. R
73. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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not restricted by time or place, the ICC exercises jurisdiction only
when national courts cannot or will not carry out the investigation or
prosecution of a person accused of the most heinous of crimes such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggres-
sion. The recent passage of Resolution 1820 finally confirmed that
sexual violence is one of the disputes the ICC may adjudicate. Sexual
violence is now qualified as a war crime, crime against humanity, or a
constitutive act with respect to genocide. As such, perpetrators can
now definitively be tried under the ICC in The Hague. Although un-
deniably a valuable gain for survivors, it remains to be seen whether
this solution is an adequate or viable remedy. To date, ICC investiga-
tors sent to quickly gather information on specific sex crimes for im-
mediate prosecution are finding that the narrowly tailored focus of
their assignments limits the nature of victims’ accounts and forces
them to overlook other related atrocities.74
In order to institute comprehensive measures for investigation
and prosecution, separate tribunals that specifically address gender-
based violations during and after armed conflict should be created.
This would serve to assist the current tribunal system of the ICC in
producing judgments or enforcing international humanitarian law.
B. International Human Rights Law
1. National and Regional Charters, Conventions, and Laws
ICRC defines international human rights law as a set of interna-
tional rules, established by treaty or custom, from which individuals
and groups can expect and/or claim certain behavior or benefits from
governments.75 The Report of the Secretary-General suggests that the
existing national and regional charters, conventions, and laws that can
be classified under international human rights law should make up
the legal framework for addressing sexual exploitation.76 The report
cites the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Charter
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the penal laws of individual
countries, and the codes of conduct of international organizations
and NGOs. In addition, because this issue particularly affects women
74. Katy Glassborow, ICC Investigative Strategy on Sexual Violence Crimes Under Fire,
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNE, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.humanrights-geneva.info/ICC-investi-
gative-strategy-on.
75. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 1 (Jan. 2003),
http://www.ehl.icrc.org/images/resources/pdf/ihl_and_ihrl.pdf.
76. See Investigation, supra note 7. R
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and girls, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women and the Declaration on the Elimination of Vio-
lence Against Women (“CEDAW”) is also relevant. Those countries
that acceded or ratified CEDAW are legally bound to implement and
practice its provisions.77 Ratifying Member States undertake several
commitments including incorporating the principle of equality of
men and women in their legal system; abolishing all discriminatory
laws and adopting laws that prohibit discrimination against women;
establishing tribunals to ensure effective protection of women; and
ensuring elimination of discrimination against women by persons, or-
ganizations, or enterprises.78 Under the Guinean Constitution, inter-
national treaties supersede national laws and can be invoked in courts
without having been directly integrated into domestic law.79 Interna-
tional human rights law is applicable at all times regardless of armed
conflict.
All countries involved—the receiving country, the neutral coun-
try, and the sending country—are bound by the documents above if
they have ratified those documents. As opposed to international hu-
manitarian law, countries that are parties to the relevant treaties can
be held accountable for violations of the relevant provisions. However,
practical implementation is a problem. At the very basic level, govern-
ments of the receiving country should have the power to hold people
accountable for their conduct. To date, it appears that governments
of countries hosting refugee camps are not required to investigate sex-
ual exploitation within those camps, possibly because the regulation
of internal affairs is left to the country’s own legislation. At most, gov-
ernments should be required to provide access to their legal systems
and prosecute alleged offenders. If the government of the receiving
country does not follow through and pursue prosecution, then who is
to advocate for the victims of sexual exploitation by humanitarian aid
workers? Can the agencies be trusted to report their own staff when it
has already been determined that a conspiracy of silence exists among
the staff on the ground and could possibly include the more senior
ranks off-site? Even SC-UK admits that if one of their own staff is impli-
77. See MAYA STEINITZ, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
SEX-BASED AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEE WOMEN 32 (2001).
78. Id.
79. Alice Farmer, Refugee Responses, State-Like Behavior, and Accountability for Human
Rights Violations: A Case Study of Sexual Violence in Guinea’s Refugee Camps, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 44, 58–59 (2006).
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cated, the allegation is immediately investigated and only referred to
the police if necessary.80
If a refugee is repatriated or resettled, it is in the interest of both
the host country and the sending country to protect those who were
violated within their borders. Allowing countries to violate agreements
they have ratified sends a message to the world that foreign policy and
promises made at government levels mean nothing. If neither country
chooses to use legal measures, then the UN can hold these govern-
ments accountable under existing resolutions and treaties.
2. UN Resolution 1325
In 2000, the UN passed Resolution 1325, an international human
rights law that can hold states responsible for their failures.81 Drafted
primarily in response to sexual exploitation violations by UN
Peacekeepers and for the purpose of increasing women’s participa-
tion at various levels during times of armed conflict, certain terms of
UN Resolution 1325 may ultimately prove applicable to sexual ex-
ploitation committed by humanitarian aid workers. Resolution 1325
states, in pertinent part:
The Security Council . . . Reaffirming also the need to implement
fully international humanitarian and human rights law that pro-
tects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts . . . .
9. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully interna-
tional law applicable to the rights and protection of women and
girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable
to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional
Protocol thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the
Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All
forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979 and the Optional
Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the Optional Protocols thereto
of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
10. Calls on all parties of armed conflict to take special measures to
protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly
rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of vio-
lence in situations of armed conflict;
11. Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impu-
nity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sex-
ual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard
80. See No One, supra note 9, at 12. R
81. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
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stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from am-
nesty provisions.82
Resolution 1325 calls for the “equal participation of women in all
peace processes, gender training in peace operations, the protection
of women and girls and respect for their human rights, and gender
mainstreaming in the reporting and implementation systems of the
UN relating to conflict, peace and security.”83 All parties, including
member states and parties to armed conflict, are expected to comply
and work towards implementation of the particular goals identified in
the resolution.84 Most importantly, individuals, human rights groups,
and international institutions can hold member states and the UN ac-
countable for failure to implement these provisions.85
The Secretary General’s report published four years after the res-
olution was passed indicated increased participation by women in the
peace process.86 However, few changes in the prevention and re-
sponse to sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian and
peacekeeping personnel have been made, even though many of the
Resolution’s provisions are written broadly enough to encompass vio-
lations by humanitarian aid workers.87
In its own report analyzing the effectiveness of Resolution 1325,
Amnesty International found that refugee camps continue to lack the
security and consideration for women’s special needs that would be
required to decrease incidents of exploitation.88 Where the UN had
implemented some of its goals, there appeared to be a lack of political
will on the part of nearly all UN Member States and various UN bod-
ies and agencies to apply the provisions of Resolution 1325 effec-
tively.89 In Liberia, neither the National Government of Liberia nor
the international community have so far demonstrated a commitment
to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
other serious crimes of international law, including rape and sexual
82. Id. at 1, 13.
83. Connie de la Vega & Chelsea E. Haley Nelson, The Role of Women in Peacekeeping
and Peacemaking: Devising Solutions to the Demand Side of Trafficking, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 437, 443 (2006).
84. Id. at 443–44.
85. Id. at 444.
86. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Secur-
ity, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/814 (Oct. 13, 2004).
87. Id. at 20–21.
88. Amnesty International, Women, Peace and Security: Fourth Anniversary of Security
Council Resolution 1325, IOR 52/004/2004, 4 (Oct. 11, 2004).
89. Id. at 3.
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violence.90 In Sierra Leone, the government and the UN established
the Special Court of Sierra Leone to “bring to justice those bearing
the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and other serious crimes under international law.”91 Also, “[w]here
new or transitional governments have created legislation addressing
violence against women, these bills were in some cases at a standstill in
the legislative process and in others are passed, only to be rendered
ineffective by a lack of implementation.”92
3. UN Resolution 1820
The passage of Resolution 1820 in 2008 gives renewed hope that
the Security Council is fully committed to preventing sexual violence
in conflict settings.93 Not only does Resolution 1820 once again urge
women’s increased participation, but also UN organizations are specif-
ically requested to work with women-led NGOs in developing mecha-
nisms in and around camps to protect refugees from sexual
violence.94 More importantly, the resolution states a “zero tolerance”
policy of sexual abuse in peacekeeping operations, calling for Mem-
ber States to immediately comply with their obligations by prosecuting
persons responsible for such acts, removing armed forces personnel,
and holding commanders responsible.95 This provision supports the
addition of an identical requirement for the disciplining of humanita-
rian aid staff. Governments may not wish to prosecute violators under
their laws for fear they will be implicitly granting refugee legal status.
Further, unless a refugee is given the UN’s official stamp of recogni-
tion by attaining refugee status, governments will remain hesitant in
providing relief. In addition, governments are less likely to provide
adequate safeguards for refugees for financial reasons since they
would rather reserve funds for their own people. Further, as noted
above, the absence of government officials within refugee camps
leaves camp administrators and humanitarian agencies in control and
perpetuates the lack of oversight. Resolution 1820 alleviates many of
the concerns governments may have about protecting non-nationals.
Finally, declaring that sexual violence is a war crime, crime against
90. Id. at 9–10.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id. at 8.
93. S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
94. Id.
95. Id.
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN108.txt unknown Seq: 18  2-OCT-09 12:26
228 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide, perpetrators
can now definitively be tried under the ICC in The Hague.96
Criminal penalties for the sexual abuse of refugees are limited.
The UN Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo is
the only mission where troops can be prosecuted for sex with prosti-
tutes.97 This also includes prosecution for sexual exploitation and
abuse.98 Otherwise, unless criminal penalties for abuse are incorpo-
rated into an individual country’s laws (either receiving or sending
countries), peacekeepers and aid workers go virtually unpunished.
IV. Recommendations for Enforcement and Accountability
A. Universal Code of Conduct
Any solution undertaken must be implemented within a broader
framework of generic human behavior standards with zero tolerance
for violations.99 The IASC in 2002 believed that any proffered solu-
tions would “raise additional questions as to who should be responsi-
ble for enforcing standards of behavior, and whether that
responsibility should be individual or collective and lie at the country,
regional, or international level.”100 In 2002, sexual exploitation at the
hands of humanitarian aid workers was “dealt with on an ad hoc basis,
from agency to agency,”101 leading to conflicting standards. Save the
Children UK, for instance, abides by their own internal Code of Con-
duct against which staff behavior is held.102 However, in 2006, SC-UK’s
report of the situation in Liberia showed little to no progress or relief
for victims of sexual exploitation.103 The general conclusion, in 2002
and today, is that appropriate and standard norms must be codified in
a universal code of conduct that specifically prohibits sexual exploita-
tion and imposes sanctions for code violations.104
OIOS suggests that the Office for the Coordination of Humanita-
rian Affairs (“OCHA”) take the lead in coordinating and harmonizing
existing codes of conduct.105 Unfortunately, OCHA is a UN agency,
96. Id.
97. Singh, supra note 9. R
98. Id.
99. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 22. R
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See No One, supra note 9, at 9. R
103. Cf. Liberia, supra note 8 (SC-UK’s report details continued sexual exploitation at R
the hands of the same perpetrators enumerated in the initial findings with UNHCR).
104. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 17. R
105. Id.
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potentially constrained by a conflict of interest. Though its role may
be limited to simply organizing and submitting the recommended
universal guidelines, its perspective might be biased in favor of the
UN. For example, OCHA may create guidelines that resist accounta-
bility at the UN level and rely exclusively on action by NGOs and
other non-UN agencies.
UNHCR has developed its own code of conduct based on interna-
tional legal standards, but it does not have the force of law.106 The
question then is whether the creation and implementation of a code
of conduct is essential, or whether the enforcement of human rights
norms and standards already in place can just as effectively achieve
the desired results.
UNHCR, an organization formed in part for the protection of
refugees, may be the appropriate agency to enforce compliance. Act-
ing frequently as the primary resource for refugees and as the um-
brella organization to which many NGOs must answer, UNHCR takes
on state-like functions. However, UNHCR has failed to implement the
policies detailed in several guidelines incorporating refugee women
and children’s rights, and “has yet to establish [an] oversight mecha-
nism to provide accountability for the behavior of its staff and volun-
teers in the field.”107 In addition, it is particularly difficult for UNHCR
to punish its own staff members when they are among the various per-
petrators of the abuse.
In most recommendations, the humanitarian agencies are re-
quired to take administrative steps against violating staff who are per-
petrators. Unfortunately, NGOs are confronted with a conflict of
interest when punishing their own personnel. The agency might not
be willing to admit any wrongdoing, might handle problems in silence
to protect its own reputation, or might be too lenient on violators
simply because they have no other means of discipline beyond dis-
missing the employee. For example, while SC-UK holds out its Code
of Conduct as an effective framework for disciplining staff, there were
fifteen allegations of misconduct towards children against SC-UK staff
in 2007, an increase from eleven allegations made in 2006.108 Of the
fifteen claims, four merely led to dismissal and only one was referred
to national authorities.109 NGOs often face other extrinsic concerns.
Alice Farmer claims, “[N]GOs rely on government funding far more
106. See Guidelines, supra note 49, at 123. R
107. See Farmer, supra note 79, at 66–67. R
108. See No One, supra note 9, at 9. R
109. Id.
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now than they did a few decades ago. Therefore, aid has begun to
mimic the political objectives of the donor government.”110
States have the ultimate decision to abide by a code of conduct,
but incentives vary for each government. Compliance depends on the
strength of the government to enforce the codes. “And while the main
responsibility for safeguarding the rights of refugees lies with states,
UNHCR’s statutory role is to assist governments to take the necessary
measures” to protect those refugees.111
B. Preventive Measures
To achieve effective change, strong prevention programs that tar-
get socio-cultural norms and community attitudes, knowledge, and be-
havior must be implemented. The most dynamic change needs to
occur in the perception of women’s roles within a community. By of-
fering literacy programs, providing vocational training, developing in-
come-generating projects, offering leadership training, and
supporting women’s groups and associations, women can become em-
powered.112 The UNHCR and SC-UK’s assessment “makes it very clear
that sexual exploitation cannot be addressed without providing alter-
native means and opportunities for earning an income.”113
OIOS suggests that UNHCR and its implementing partners sensi-
tize the refugee population on sexual exploitation.114 Because of
UNHCR’s pivotal role in refugee lives, it is important that UNHCR
take the lead, even though there may be conflicts of interest if one of
its own staff is implicated. Still, UNHCR is the ultimate authority for
legal status and resettlement away from the camps and may have the
most power in these situations.
UNHCR should involve women, including refugee women in the
development of preventive measures. OIOS advances, “The involve-
ment of women in the distribution process needs to be significantly
enhanced. . . . UNHCR should take steps to ensure recruitment of
refugees for jobs in the camps by aid agencies is equitably and trans-
parently undertaken without any discrimination . . . .”115 Humanita-
rian organizations, including UN agencies, must be aware of the
110. Id. at 69.
111. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Note on Interna-
tional Protection, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/930 (July 7, 2000)
[hereinafter International Protection].
112. See Guidelines, supra note 49, at 38. R
113. See UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, supra note 3, at 8. R
114. See Guidelines, supra note 49, at 35–36. R
115. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 18. R
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various factors within the specific refugee community including demo-
graphic composition, social and cultural norms, family structure, atti-
tudes of persons in leadership, and available services and facilities.
To prevent sexual exploitation and abuse at the hands of humani-
tarian aid workers, it is important to assess each camp’s opportunity
for sexual violence. One such method of assessment is the “Opportu-
nity Matrix,” a chart that camp leaders can fill out to determine the
possible victims, perpetrators, location, and other factors.116 The chart
identifies different activities, goods, or services in the refugee camp
that traditionally provide opportunities for sexual exploitation.117 The
chart further reveals the time, place, manner and perpetrators:
“Where” indicates where the activity takes place or where the good or
service is obtained; “Who” indicates who is in charge of the activity or
distributes the good or service; “How” indicates how the good or ser-
vice is obtained, and “Who/With Whom” indicates who engages in the
activity or obtains the good or service and with whom (if anyone).118
This fairly simple method can also be separately filled out by the refu-
gees, providing a richer perspective that humanitarian workers may
not have.
In response to the UNHCR and SC-UK report, the Coordination
Committee for the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (“CC-
SEA”) was immediately tasked with creating a comprehensive training
manual for humanitarian agencies and staff.119 The manual provides
various exercises and learning tools, breaks down the subjects in easily
manageable ways, and includes relevant documents, such as the Stan-
dards of Accountability. These standards, which are also helpful in
drafting and codifying a universal code of conduct, state the most ba-
sic responsibilities of humanitarian aid workers, such as never condon-
ing or participating in corrupt activities.120 However, IASC reports
that awareness tools like the Standards of Accountability mean little
unless there is a method of recourse or protective action that will take
place in case of an allegation. As such, the training provided by the
CCSEA must stress some viable relief to victims or those reporting ex-
116. Julie Dugan, Carolyn J. Fowler & Paul A. Bolton, Assessing the Opportunity for Sexual
Violence Against Women and Children in Refugee Camps, J. Humanitarian Assistance 3 (2000).
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id.
119. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (“OCHA”),
Coordination Committee for the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Understand-
ing Humanitarian Aid Worker Responsibilities: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Prevention, 3
(2003).
120. Id. at 47.
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ploitation or abuse. Further, the training is designed to be covered in
only one day, stating that if time permits, the training can be ex-
tended to a two-day period to allow for deeper discussion and to allevi-
ate participant and facilitator fatigue.121 Regardless if the training is
held for one or two days, such a short time period is not enough to
adequately train workers and instill the requisite gender sensitivity.
Humanitarian aid workers, as well as UN peacekeepers, are not staffed
in refugee camps for long periods of time; therefore, camps often ex-
perience high staff turnover. The manual does not address training
for new staff entering camps where only two-and-a-half hours is al-
lowed to discuss key concepts of gender/sex, violence, power, and in-
formed consent. The training must be expanded to increase its impact
on the trainees and allow for more time to adequately understand key
concepts and reflect on them. The training should also be mandatory
to all new staff and facilitated by a senior official to stress its
importance.
Also, refugee communities must be educated and informed about
their rights. They must be engaged fully in order to maintain and fur-
ther a sustainable system by which all refugees continue to protect the
interests and safety of women and children. Asylum Access, a non-
profit providing legal aid and advocacy to refugees, and the University
of Capetown developed the Sustained Advocacy for Empowered Refu-
gees (“SAFER”)122 project in response to xenophobic violence against
refugees. SAFER provides a good model for educating the refugee
community. Through it, refugee community leaders—designated by
the community and not necessarily holding administrative positions
within the camps—are taught their rights and legal recourse. Theoret-
ically, these refugee leaders go back to their communities and teach
another group of refugees, who in turn teach their own groups of
refugees, and so on. It might be most effective to create an all-encom-
passing training for refugee leaders and the rest of the community. In
addition, as one of the elements of this training, facilitators can in-
clude a more expansive and in-depth training procedure adopted
from the CCSEA regarding sexual exploitation. Classes can be taught
to refugees over a couple of months with the CCSEA training covering
at least a week.
121. Id. at 5.
122. Asylum Access, available at http://www.asylumaccess.org/2006/12/ (last visited
Sept. 7, 2009).
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C. Reporting and Monitoring
Reporting procedures are a vital step in achieving appropriate re-
lief, but they straddle a fine line; if the victim reports an incident and
there is no remedy or care is not provided in a timely, compassionate,
and confidential manner, then her trust in the services is destroyed
and subsequent victims will fail to report.123 There must be a desig-
nated place and person for all claims to go, and these claims must be
responded to immediately since corroboration within a refugee com-
munity is fraught with time-sensitive problems.
OIOS recommends that UNHCR take the lead, coordinating with
other aid agencies and NGOs, to develop the methods by which refu-
gees can quickly report exploitation in confidence and anony-
mously.124 It also recommends that UNHCR appoint a person to set
up an independent reporting system that reaches into the refugee
camps and communities,125 who would oversee and monitor all re-
ported cases from the nearest UNHCR branch.126
However, the limitations associated with UNHCR also prevent the
application of OIOS’s proposals. Not only are some UNHCR offices
far-removed from camp settings, UNHCR accessibility to camps is re-
stricted in armed conflict-affected regions because of the volatile se-
curity of the situation and the inability to access the camps.127
UNHCR is also limited by its double mandate—simultaneously pro-
tecting refugees from repression and facilitating state policies towards
refugees—duties that often conflict.128 Despite the proposed “inde-
pendence” of this reporting agency under UNHCR, a conflict of inter-
est can be inferred if reports implicate UNHCR’s own personnel.
UNHCR cannot be both the protector of refugees and the prosecutor
of its employees or agents. It is thus imperative that the agency envi-
sioned by OIOS be substantially separate from UN and NGO prejudi-
cial interests. In addition, sending all reports to UNHCR creates a
huge workload that is likely to stress UN funds and overwhelm agency
employees. As a result, international NGOs would be entrusted with
periodically auditing themselves, rendering an independent agency
useless. This measure is questionable if the independent agency is not
123. See Guidelines, supra note 49, at 56. R
124. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 17. R
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Farmer, supra note 79, at 78. R
128. Id.
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solely responsible for receiving data and enforcing failures in
compliance.
Consequently, the best system is to designate a neutral working
group to handle reports so that an immediate response and a thor-
ough, unbiased review can occur. Developing recommendations to in-
stall an ombudsman system,129 UNHCR and NGOs should, together,
appoint the members of this working group and collectively construct
appropriate and effective procedures. Funding for such a system may
prove the most problematic for implementation. UNHCR receives
funding through governmental, intergovernmental, and non-govern-
mental donors.130 However, UNHCR funds are stretched over the
world through several programs, and a working group may be low on
its list of priorities. Additionally, UNHCR faces various funding crises
for other equally important projects. For example, in 2005, the volun-
tary repatriation of Burundi refugees was reduced due to lack of
funds, and UNHCR was forced to supplement $33 million dollars by
delving into its emergency fund from its operational reserve.131 Un-
like massive programs such as the Burundian repatriation, funding for
the working group might be minimal in comparison. Separate fund-
ing could be secured solely for administrative processes and might be
provided by private donors, NGOs, or other agencies.
As for monitoring, OIOS recommends UNHCR and NGOs have a
“more visible presence in the camps, increasing the number of field
staff working inside the refugee camps so as to better monitor camp
activities and ensure that refugees are indeed receiving the services to
which they are entitled.”132 However, it is unclear whether a larger
NGO presence would do anything to deter those NGOs involved in
the abuse since a conspiracy of silence and implicit acquiescence cur-
rently exists. UN agencies presume that senior international staff will
be able to effectively monitor and report sexual exploitation, but a
neutral committee made up of different people—lawyers, consultants,
and psychologists—from different humanitarian agencies or NGOs
should be the designated monitoring body. A small group hailing
from different backgrounds can judge the situations impartially.
Both reporting and monitoring groups may be most effective if
located in one central place, but there must be similar sub-groups on
129. Id. at 83.
130. UNHCR, UNHCR Global Report 2005: Funding UNHCR’s Programmes, 1 (2005).
131. Press Release, UNHCR, Funding Crisis Threatens Return Hopes of Thousands of
Burundian Refugees  (Oct. 28, 2005).
132. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 18. R
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the ground to easily access the various refugee camps throughout the
world.
D. Investigation
It is imperative that UNHCR and other agencies implement clear,
mandatory procedures and guidelines for the investigation of sexual
exploitation of refugees and other related conduct.133 In investigating
claims, the safety of the victim and her family, as well her confidential-
ity must be secured. Without exception, interviews must be conducted
in private settings. As recommended by the UNHCR Guidelines, only
a few pieces of necessary information should be shared outside the
survivor’s confidence. Any written information must be maintained in
a secure, locked area.134 The interviewers should be highly skilled and
well trained, able to deal with the overwhelming emotion of the situa-
tion, especially in interviews with children. They should also be neu-
tral or, at the very least, if a humanitarian agency worker is accused,
the interviewers should have no connection to that agency. It is prefer-
able for any party involved in the interview process to be of the same
sex, making it easier to establish trust. Unnecessary parties should be
excluded from these meetings, but if third parties, such as translators,
are required, they should come from outside the community and
should be provided established terms of reference for their work.
E. Legal Redress
Many cases reported by UNHCR and SC-UK were handled by the
respective NGO’s administrative procedures, and the alleged perpe-
trators were either fired or suspended. The IASC Task Force notes the
loss of financial benefit that comes from beingfired or suspended is
not sufficient nor is it “appropriate punishment for sexual abuse and
exploitation of women and children.”135 Although NGOs should take
an initial lead in dealing with the violators on their staff, there must
be legal ramifications—possibly incarceration, monetary remedy, or
public non-violent shame—to incentivize staff members to follow in-
ternational rules of conduct. In addition, there must be adequate pun-
ishment to encourage victims to come forward and proceed through
the court system. Otherwise, under-reporting will encourage acquies-
133. See id. at 17.
134. See Guidelines, supra note 49, at 29. R
135. See IASC Task Force, supra note 5, at 2. R
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cence and further the perpetuation of violence. The UNHCR Guide-
lines reports:
Community attitudes of blaming the victim/survivor are often re-
flected in the courts. Many sexual and gender-based crimes are dis-
missed or guilty perpetrators are given light sentences. In some
countries, the punishment meted out to perpetrators constitutes
another violation of the victim’s/survivor’s rights and freedoms,
such as in cases of forced marriage to the perpetrator.136
Stigma and social disgrace magnifies the emotional trauma suffered
by victims/survivors and implies that the perpetrator is not the one at
fault.
Because of the nature of refugees—people forced to flee with no
legal recourse in their home country for violations occurring in the
host country—governments receiving refugees should take responsi-
bility and punish or provide relief to victims under their laws. Though
they should be willing to prosecute or advocate for prosecution, it is
impractical for these countries to advocate for the refugees’ interest in
a judicial system that prioritizes nationals. Thus, national laws lacking
adequate safeguards, perpetuating discriminatory practices, and ex-
cluding refugees from its protections permits gender-based violence
to continue with impunity.137
In determining the capacity of a government to undertake en-
forcement of refugee rights, political economist Francis Fukuyama
states “that it is necessary to measure both the scope of the state’s
functions and the strength of the state’s institutional capacities.”138
Even if countries sympathetic to the refugee plight pursue an ambi-
tious plan to provide for victims, if implemented ineptly, measures are
useless and possibly exacerbate the situation by revealing the empti-
ness of the government’s promises.139 In Sierra Leone and Liberia, for
example, IASC reports that the legal and justice systems are weak,
challenged by “[i]nadequate legislation and ineffective and corrupt
police forces and barely functioning court systems.”140 In order to
combat this problem, one of the most basic legal foundations—effec-
tive counsel—must be provided. Legislative advocacy focused on the
best interests of the survivor, e.g., human rights and gender equality,
136. See Guidelines, supra note 49, at 24. R
137. Id.
138. See Farmer, supra note 79, at 73. R
139. Id. at 74.
140. See IASC Task Force, supra note 5, at 10. R
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not only aids and regulates judicial systems, but also can ensure coun-
try-wide change.141
It is of vital importance to hold perpetrators accountable and pro-
vide due process of law to the victims. Governments, like Sierra Leone
and Liberia, have the power to review their current laws, add or
amend them as needed, and appropriately penalize persons regard-
less of their status (official or aid worker) to prevent sexual violence
and exploitation of all people within their borders. Legislation and
best practices, as designated by the UN or other international commu-
nity body, should be implemented within a short period of time by all
governments that are party to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Resolution 1325, or Resolution 1820.142 Whether directed
through Resolution 1325 or general international humanitarian or
customary law, governments must provide adequate legal redress. It is
important to establish proper legal responses to victims’ claims. There
should be stable legal procedures with sufficient training for police,
government officials/administrators, and attorneys. Unlike many
other general crimes, sexual violence requires special attention be-
cause of its complex nature. It is recommended that police undergo
the same training provided for humanitarian workers and refugee
communities. And, in cases involving children, there must be child-
friendly judicial procedures.
Many governments will continue to be unwilling to recognize ref-
ugees within their borders. In such a case, the UN must hold the gov-
ernment accountable for its failure to abide by international human
rights law. If the OIOS acknowledges that security in the camps is the
responsibility of the government, then it follows that the protection of
the people within the camps be upheld in a government’s judicial sys-
tem. Should the government fail or refuse to comply, the UN has vari-
ous options: imposing sanctions, providing help (technical or
otherwise) for enforcement, or publicizing the country’s failings,
thereby shaming the government.
1. Legal Aid Clinics
Legal aid clinics are a vital source for legal redress for refugee
women and children. Refugees are often not adequately informed of
their legal rights and usually lack funds to seek legal aid. They need
affordable or pro bono advocates.
141. Id. at 8.
142. See Liberia, supra note 8, at 19. R
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American Refugee Committee International (“ARC”) imple-
mented two legal aid clinics in Guinea to specifically work with refu-
gee survivors of gender-based violence from Liberia and Sierra
Leone.143 The clinics provide three primary services: (1) education on
the legal rights of women and children; (2) confidential advice to wo-
men and children regarding their legal rights and options under the
law; and (3) legal representation of women and children whose rights
have been violated. The clinics also lobby the government for refugee
protection and provide counseling to survivors, believing that emo-
tional and social support is essential for survivors pursuing the long
and difficult process of legal justice.144 ARC itself “did not embark on
legal aid until the minimum [gender-based violence] prevention and
response services were in place and trust was gained from the commu-
nity.”145 Legal aid, according to ARC, is a “critical and necessary ele-
ment to ensure an adequate and multi-sectoral approach.”146 UNHCR
likewise recognizes the need for legal assistance, funding lawyers’ net-
works and legal clinics in several countries to provide legal assistance,
counseling, and advice to asylum-seekers and refugees, particularly
refugee women.147 However, the obstacles deriving from legislation,
the sensitive nature of the subject area, and the potential threats re-
quire organizations to be careful and selective in implementing legal
aid. If not instituted at the appropriate time and as part of a larger,
comprehensive scheme, legal aid can be just as ineffective as weakly
administered laws.148
2. Resolutions 1325 and 1820
A universal law that binds all perpetrators is imperative. However,
both Resolutions 1325 and 1820 are not legally binding; they strongly
encourage governments to abide by their provisions.149 In addition,
while Resolution 1325’s effectiveness is subject to debate, the newly
enacted Resolution 1820’s influence has yet to be determined. Despite
this, both resolutions have the potential to effectuate change, even if
it is small change. The Resolutions should be expressly expanded to
include all perpetrators of sexual exploitation against women and
143. See ARC Int’l, Gender-Based Violence: Legal Aspects of Violence Against Refugee Women in
Kissidougou Town and Albadariah Camps, 7-18 (2005).
144. Id. at 8.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See International Protection, supra note 111, at 6. R
148. Id.
149. See Amnesty International, supra note 88, at 2. R
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girls who are victims of armed conflict. Provisions should include spe-
cific references to abuse and exploitation by humanitarian aid
workers.
Since the passing of Resolution 1325, the participation of women
at decision-making levels has increased. In 2003, for example, Libe-
rian women formed the Mano River Women Peace Network, which
participated in Liberia peace talks.150 Provisions should specifically in-
clude women in power positions at the camp level. Women should be
included at every level of these recommendations, from internal audit
procedures within each individual NGO to reporting and monitoring
situations. At the day-to-day camp level, the involvement of women in
the distribution process and in overall camp administration needs to
be significantly enhanced.151 The host country should be responsible
for handling violations, but if any of the provisions are violated, the
UN must force governments to prosecute or repair the situations. If
governments fail to do so, the UN must punish violators either
through sanctions or public international shaming.
Conclusion
The issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian aid
workers is complex and inherently problematic. For any of the above
recommendations to be implemented and for more participants to be
included, funding must be provided to the NGOs and UNHCR, but
funding is scarce. Without adequate funding, these agencies cannot
implement the procedures that are vital in minimizing sexual ex-
ploitation, even when the abuse is so close to home. Consequently,
the UN must implement stringent safeguards and closely monitor
agencies at all levels to ensure proper remedies exist and perpetrators
are prosecuted. Both governments and humanitarian agencies look to
the UN for guiding principles, and the UN should respond with the
appropriate disciplinary actions. Many of the recommendations
adopted and amended here are based on the UN’s own suggestions,
and, thus, indicate that the UN knows it is a key player in affecting
change. It is important that it—as the governing body of international
human rights law—promote the welfare of refugee women and chil-
dren who are victims of sexual exploitation.
150. Id. at 18.
151. See Investigation, supra note 7, at 18. R
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